Question and structure of the text
Can the above mentioned approach to administrative contracts solve current and future problems for good? In view of increasing instances of cooperation between the state and private parties, this seems questionable at least. The contractual regimes regulating interactions between the state and private persons that are emerging with increasing intensity in an increasing number of places raise doubts as to whether this Sisyphus task can be succeeded of drawing together a proactive form of administration that depends more and more on cooperation and subjecting it to a state derived form of legitimacy. This simultaneously raises questions about the governing theories; the theory of sovereignty on one hand and the theory of social contract on the other hand.
Taking the viewpoint of the civil law tradition with its long-term experience with state-derived legitimacy, I will approach this set of problems in three steps:
− The first step will be to recall the basic principles of the traditional administrative law doctrine that frequently remain unexpressed: the idealtypical concepts of the modern sovereign national state and the social contract, of which we find crucial elements in the theories of Bodin and Hobbes, and which were adapted to democracy by Rousseu. These concepts substantially shape modern administrative law and the status of the administrative contract, admittedly more in the civil law doctrine of sovereignty than in the common law doctrine (part II).
− Following this, two groups of cases that paradigmatically stand for the fundamental aspects of state will be examined as to whether they can still be adequately solved using traditional concepts of administrative law. The first group of cases deals with the delegation of governance in a hierarchical administrative organisation. Lawyers in the 18 th and 19 th centuries have already largely dealt with this question in the light of the relationship between the state and civil servants (part III.A.). The second group of cases deals with the interventionist and welfare state experiences of administrative economic and legal resources respectively, which are not able to keep up with their mandate of framing or at least guaranteeing the unity and welfare of society. And even more radically: the administration simply lacks the knowledge about the society it is supposed to organise (part III.B.). − In the last part, the two groups of cases referred to will be shown to be part of a yet greater problem, touching on the self-conception of the administration and of administrative law as a regulatory authority with regard to the unity and welfare of society: the fundamental concepts of our construct of society and in particular the concept of the state prove to be increasingly contingent. From this it follows that the idea of a social contract encompassing society is increasingly split into numerous small contracts, which provide a functional equivalent to the social contract -not only with effect, but also in law (part IV).
II. Social contract, administrative law, administrative contracts
Bodins' doctrine of sovereignty, Hobbes' social contract and Rousseau's expansion to Democracy
The moment in which command and authority-related semantics change from supreme power (suprema potestas) to sovereignty (majestas) marks the starting point of modern theories of sovereignty, which have greatly influenced the emergence of the social contract. In general, Bodin is seen as the founder of this doctrine of sovereignty, 5 in which it is up to politics to reunite a society fragmented by religious wars: by means of united power in the hands of the king on the one side and by consistent and equal use of this sovereign power to govern the people on the other. Prominent differences to England became apparent, where religious disputes were relatively easily resolved.
Accordingly, Bodin created a twofold subordination: Firstly, the monarch is subordinate to God and the monarch's authority is subordinate to natural law. At the same time, however, not God but the monarch is the sovereign representative of men on earth. In doing so, Bodin not only took the step of separating the monarch from God. As an image of God, the monarch was also separated from mankind, over whom he exerted life-long absolute power in a hierarchical manner. In this sense, the flesh and body of the monarch contains the sovereignty of society over fragmented society -a body that is subject to the borders of human life. The great revolution nota bene felt forced to eliminate precisely this body in order to be able to overcome the old order. Furthermore, parlamentarianism was strengthened due to the later civil war -for more on the differences between the civil law tradition and the common law tradition, see DIETER GRIMM, Der Staat in der kontinentaleuropäischen Tradition, in: Grimm, Recht und Staat der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft 53-83 (Frankfurt a.M., 1987): pp. 56 onwards.
Hobbes, in particular, added the element of the social contract to Bodin's theory, 9 by which each one of the so called multitude "… by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author" and unite in the "commonwealth" for "peace and common defence".
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Hobbes notably illustrated this unity of the multitude of society in the body of the monarch on what is possibly the most famous book cover in history 11 -again, in the tradition of the continental doctrine of sovereignty, which in turn affected rather the continent than the British isles. 12 We have now briefly established the connection between modern politics, sovereignty and social contract: while Bodin made the sovereignty of society an issue of political authority, so that it had to assume responsibility for the unity of society, from the perspective of modern politics, Hobbes internalized the reference point of political legitimacy by separating the monarch from his likeness to God, making him a representative of the multitude of his subjects -as symbolized by the social contract. This legitimacy of the omnipotence of the state for the benefit of society was finally relocated by Rousseau without changing its form: from "l'état, c'est moi" to "l'état, c'est nous". However, in spite of this relocation from representation by the king to representation by the unity of a democratic multitude, the principle of centralised and absolute sovereign power as the uniting force of society remained -probably also due to the catchy metaphor of corporal unity. It is well known fact that the social contract already appeared in Althusius. However, from another, more liberal (today's perspective) context: JOHANNES ALTHUSIUS, Politica methodice digesta atque exemplis sacris et profanis illustrata (Aalen, 1603/1981).
The central passage states: " For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to perform the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad, And in him consisteth the essence of the commonwealth ; which, to define it, is one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence. And he that carrieth this person, is called SOVEREIGN, and said to have sovereign power ; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.": THOMAS HOBBES, Leviathan: or the matter, form, and power of a commonwealth ecclesiastical and civil (London, 1651/1839): p. 158. Hobbes thus professes his affiliation to the continental -and above all French -doctrine of sovereignty: PRESTON KING, The ideology of order: a comparative analysis of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes (London, 1999): see especially pp. 56 onwards.
13 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Du contrat social ou principes du droit politique (Paris, 1795). Although Rousseau's theory initially persevered, according to which all sovereignty was in the hands of the people, without restriction, and the sovereign was simply able to dispose over everything, by contrast to Sieyès theory, according to which certain elements of law, particularly understood to be "droits de l'homme" (human rights) and perceived to be more of a requirement than a restriction on political communication, acquired pre-state character and constitutional protection through a predecessor of the constitutional court: EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYÈS, Le Tiers-Etat (Paris, 1789/1888). Benjamin Constant (1767-1830) also spoke out against an absolutist understanding of the people's sovereignty: BENJAMIN CONSTANT, Principes de politiques, applicables à tous les gouvernements représentatifs, et
Social Contract and the abolishment of the corporative feudal state
In the transition from the 18 th to the 19 th century, the banishment of contract on the continent as a legal form for stabilizing diffuse, power-related cooperation coincided most notably with the emergence of another great form of contract: the social contract. 14 Thus, the task of stabilizing society by means of contract changed the frame of reference from law to social theory. The great social contract abolished (in German: "aufheben") the many small contracts on the diffusion of power in a threefold Hegelian sense: first of all, it preserved the term "contract". Secondly, it lifted the many small contracts to the level of society as a whole. And thirdly, it disposed of the contract as a form of law between the state and private parties. As regards content, the social contract promised to regenerate societal unity: defence from danger and social welfare for all, if, in return, the sovereign was able to unite the power that had been fragmented and dispersed throughout society. 15 At the same time, the modern state finally freed itself from independent judicial review. 16 This unification of power in the sovereign, this concise hierarchical use and legitimation of power sought to replace the old intertwined network of feudal power dispersion contracts, in which the interests of the ruling regime had to be aligned with the interests of the contracting party, and in which bilateral conflicts of power arose where interests clashed.
17

Implementation through Administrative law
In Germany and Switzerland at the turn of the 20 th century, Otto Mayer and Fritz Fleiner decisively influenced the creation of a modern administrative law that particulièrement à la constitution actuelle de la France (Paris, 1815): pp. 13 onwards.
14 For example, this is shown by the way in which German lawyers regularly re-define acts of cooperation with the state as hierarchic relationships, leaving little room for contractual regulation: amongst others, see JOHANN HEINRICH GOTTLOB VON − On the one hand, the emerging administrative law treated the production of law in the same way as the production of norms by the state.
19
The administration benefited from this so called legal authority of the state and implemented it purposefully in the realization of its political programs.
20
In addition to relying on its influence in the legislative process and by absorbing the French invention of the administrative decision (copied from the court decision and transferred into German law by Otto Mayer), 21 the administration enrobed its constantly changing projects in the cloak of the law. In this way, the administrative procedure initially appeared to be a functional equivalent of an independent court procedure, furthermore allowing for systematic re-structuring of administrative communication according to legal criteria.
22
In doing so, administrative decisions, as a form of communicating public authority, nestled close to the doctrine of 
21
Demonstrated by the following statement of OTTO MAYER, Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht (Leipzig, 1895/96), I: p. 60: "So können wir sagen, dass aus dem jahrhundertelangen Kampfe der französischen Parlamente mit der königlichen Verwaltung, der auch sonst manche bedeutsame Spuren im französischen Rechte zurückgelassen hat, schliesslich doch die Parlamente als Sieger hervorgegangen sind. Es ist nicht gelungen, die Verwaltung der Macht der Justiz äusserlich zu unterwerfen. Aber sie hat sich zu den Ideen bekennen müssen, deren Trägerin die Justiz war. Die Rechtsordnung, in welcher diese sich darstellte, beruhte auf einem ganz bestimmten System von rechtlicher Gebundenheit: das Gesetz über alles, das Urteil gebunden an das Gesetz, die der Vollstreckung gebunden an das Urteil. In der Übertragung dieser Gebundenheit auf die Verwaltung liegt die Grundidee des neuen französischen Verwaltungsrechtes." ("Thus we can say that the battles between the French parliament and the royal administration that lasted for centuries and significantly influenced French law were ultimately won by the parliaments. The administration did not succumb to the judiciary -even from an external perspective. But it did have to admit to ideas that were initiated by the judiciary. The legal order in which these presented themselves was based on a very special system of legal adherence: statute above everything, jurisdiction bound to statute, and execution bound to jurisdiction. In transferring this adherence to the administration, the basic idea behind new French administrative law was born."). See OTTO MAYER, Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht (Leipzig, 1895/96), I: p. 95 for more on the form of rulings, explicitly. sovereignty and to the image the modern state had of itself.
23
− On the other hand, the police state and monarchic government (or, accordingly, a monarchically acting government) were supposed to be counteracted by an administrative law that had become infused by scientific principles.
24
The administrative decision was interlinked with the concept of the Rechtsstaat as a sovereign hierarchic authority of law, whose administration sought to be tied to legal rules and be enacted within the reservation of statutory powers.
25
III. Irritating cases: the trend of disintegration of the theories of sovereignty and social contract
In the following, two groups of cases will demonstrate how recent cases tie in with the above mentioned guiding administrative law principles. These groups of cases are paradigmatic of the fundamental aspects of the state, and furthermore correspond with the generally applied historical model, which divides the evolution of administrative law into a phase of existence as a police state and a subsequent phase of existence as an interventionist welfare state. First of all, the civil service (A.) and secondly, the typical administrative tasks of the welfare state (B.) will be tested with regard to their relationships with the theory of sovereignty and the 23 This already follows from Otto Mayer's definition OTTO MAYER, Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht (Leipzig, 1895/96): p. 95: "Der Verwaltungsakt ist ein der Verwaltung zugehöriger obrigkeitlicher Ausspruch, der dem Unterthanen gegenüber im Einzelfall bestimmt, was für ihn Rechtens sein soll." ("The administrative act is an authoritarian claim vis-á-vis the administration that determines the rights of a subordinate individual in a particular case.").
24
It may be surprising that the latter applies not only to Germany, but also to Switzerland. However, remember that the democratic-constitutional structures of the comparatively young, Swiss federal state were not made to curb the government and leadership by the federal council, but rather to ensure convergence between the Cantons. In this context, see for example comments by the federal counsellor and legal scholar Jakob Dubs (1822-1879): it is the natural consequence for independent administrative legal process to reject a -at most selfrestricting -form of sovereign politics and to support the professionalization of the administration and political participation by the people: JAKOB DUBS, Das öffentliche Recht der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft dargestellt für das Volk (Zürich, 1878): p. 14, p. social contract theory. Following this, their relationship with the corresponding specific legal rules will be examined.
A. The concern about the rule of law: From the bureaucratic to the cooperative state
Instrumental law versus the rule of law
On the level of specific civil law doctrines, current problems relating to the civil service manifest themselves, because important differences in substantive law rely on the private or public law nature of a case, and because this private / public law division has become increasingly contingent. For example, the following and thus far unresolved aspect touches on the fundamental mechanisms of the democratic rule of law-legitimacy:
26
Is it conceivable for the state by its legal authority to change, either by legislation or by administrative decree, and to allocate a civil service contract to public law on one occasion and to private law on another occasion, according to its changing political needs? The question behind this question is: to what degree can political discourse implement law instrumentally, thereby possibly even disposing of the rule of law principles, by which it ought to be kept in check for the benefit of civil society? Kelsen also criticised this situation, in which the legal authority of the sovereign (i.e. the sovereign's power to create legal rules) encroaches its role as a contracting party.
27
However, Kelsen's criticism, essentially, did not persevere. Although Kelsens position was heard by administrative-law scholars, it was rejected as an unrealistic position, based on a theory that focussed on legal logic alone: Apelt commented pointedly: "Kelsen … recently stated -and correctly from his point of view -that administrative acts are not an institution of law. The fact that he comes to this astonishing conclusion that is so distant from real life and its requirements, strongly throws the criteria from which he draws his conclusions into doubt": WILLIBALT APELT, Der the other group remains largely unprotected, as it falls under a public services legislation that is mainly driven by fiscal, political interests. 30 Moreover, the legislative and government of the Canton of Graubünden recently wanted to set up legislation to transfer psychiatric services into an independent public law corporation, in order to provide it with "the greatest entrepreneurial freedom possible" by circumventing compulsory private law norms with its public law status and by circumventing unwanted public law norms through the blanket delegation of legislative powers concerning employment regulation.
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The Civil Service as a paradigmatic point of contact between the state and civil society These modern problems with administrative contracts can be better understood if we take a look at their past, in the course of which the link between the sovereignty doctrine and the social contract theory will be disclosed as well. Central principles, such as the principle of an undivided state sovereign have been colliding with öffentliches Recht] einreisst und der Grundstruktur unserer Rechtsordnung widerspricht." ("Because it is insofar an exclusive special opinion that is far from reality; a wall separating our legal system [i.e. the separation between private and public law], which contradicts our legal order"): KLAUS STERN, Zur Grundlegung einer Lehre des öffentlich-rechtlichen Vertrags, Verw. Archiv 49 106-157 (1958): p. 107. Kelsen, however, was not against a separation of public from private law per se, but rather primarily against the way in which public law connected legal subjects to legal authority. Correctly MARTIN BULLINGER, Öffentliches Recht und Privatrecht (Stuttgart, 1968): pp. 11-12. Although Kelsen's warning was incorporated in § 54 of the German administrative procedural code, for instance, adminstrative contracts regulating services provision by the civil authorities, which gave private contractual partners legal claims, were strongly restricted. As a whole, the conglomeration of legal authority with legal subjects that Kelsen criticised has persevered: see below at Fn. 91: p. 4. social demands since the late 18 th century (with regard to conflicts concerning the civil service) 32 or 19 th century (with regard to conflicts concerning the transfer of state responsibilities to private actors in a broad sense) 33 in such a way as to irritate both the concrete legal doctrine and the legal theory of the civil service. Ultimately, it is possible to trace the debate about the stabilization of cooperation between state authority and private persons back to the birth of the modern national state. For nothing less than the fundamental paradox of the modern state hides behind it -the modern state claiming total power in order to unite society, but at the same time reverting back to cooperation with the same civil actors it subjected to its rule in the first place, as a means of securing general welfare.
34
In the 18 th and 19 th centuries, German academics had already recognized that all pre-modern privileges and guarantees could indeed be abolished, except for those of the civil servants: 35 the civil servants remained a last and unavoidable point of contact between modern and thus radically self-referential politics and society. For the modern state had to rely on the good will of its civil servants from the very beginning, 
This refers to the connection between sovereignty and the social contract.
35
An important part was played by the role of the administration (in the German concept) as an independent mediator between regal authority and the people -in the sense of a functional equivalent to enable the participation of the people in the legislative process, which could never have been attained by the weakly represented citizens, and harnessed and made the political power whose hold on society was becoming stronger and stronger appear legitimized. However, the secure position of civil servants that is protected from arbitrariness of power has been put into perspective to this day mainly by two measures:
− Since the replacement of the fiscal theory (by virtue of which civil servants' monetary interests received a certain level of protection from the civil courts) by differentiated administrative law, the harmonization of state interests with existential interests of the civil servants wholly depends on positivism centred on the state. This positivism constantly threatens to affect private parties' positions, as the administration is capable of drawing on state authority to boost its position as a (contracting) party at all times.
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− Furthermore, liberal theories were brought forward from time to time during the 19 th century, which dominated the subject matter from the end of the Second World War onwards. The political internalization of these resources was often aspired to, with the help of the national ethos, but without the intended effect of long-term stabilization: see e.g. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, Die "Rechtsphilosophie" von 1820 (Stuttgart, 1820): § 268 and 294. 38 The foundation for this positivistic concept is given, amongst others, by FRITZ 
New old problems concerning civil service and the dissolution of the social contract
The far-reaching importance of giving the civil service a legal form has been displayed in various ways: its was already evident in Germany at the end of the 19 th century, where, in order to overcome the former police state, administrative law was mainly formed with a focus on the civil service. 42 Furthermore, in Switzerland at the beginning of the 20 th century, the project to introduce an independent judicial review on administrative practice gained ground, thanks to a series of scandalized cases, in which civil servants felt threatened by an arbitrary state authority. 43 Further on, the increasing cooperation between the state and the private sector was directly linked to the re-evaluation of the civil service in the modern national state. See in particular as a result of the Spaeni case (a civil servant working in the department for telegraphs had been disciplined by the federal council) that even the federal assembly invited the federal council to seriously consider the introduction of an administrative legal process. "The federal council has been invited to investigate and report on the question of whether it is advisable to introduce a confederate administrative authority that has the power to decide over claims issued by civil servants and employees of the federal administration in relation to decrees and dispositions of the federal council or other federal institutions in cases of a breach of constitutional and federally accepted rights": cited according to the missive of the federal council to the federal assembly in relation to the revision of the federal constitution with regard to creating a confederate administrative court, of Forsthoff, for example, pointed our that the increase in public law contracts was caused by the fact that the administration no longer worked according to a strict hierarchy and civil servants were no longer the sole point of contact of the state to society: ERNST FORSTHOFF, Lehrbuch des Verwaltungsrechts erster Band (Munich, 1958): p. 250-251.
The importance of giving the civil service a specific legal form is also evident in current topics of discussion, such as the above mentioned problems with privatelaw regulated doctors working in public hospitals. 45 Furthermore, the responsibility of the state to arrange for the safety of its citizens obviously leads to a similar set of questions. Given the radical change of the internal and external need for safety and the politically driven 'essentialization' of government responsibilities, 46 the state increasingly contracts with external contractors to provide safety and corresponding security personnel services. 47 In this case, two different forms of contractual services have to be distinguished: contracted civil service or military service on the one hand and indirectly contracted mercenary service on the other:
On the one hand, for example, the US today does not have a general conscription obligation. This goes back to the experience of the Vietnam war (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) and means that soldiers enter into military service and into the sphere of state authority by contract and of their free will.
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This also applies to those members of the National Guard who were initially contracted and qualified in the USA for specific military formations and for a one-year disaster operation. Following Nine-Eleven, the Bush administration invoked a contractual clause of state emergency in the more than one hundred page-contract, relocating the place of service from the US to Iraq and Afghanistan and prolonging the duration of service from the explicitly stated one year to several years of combat duty, For a concise analysis, see CYNTHIA GIMBEL/ALAN BOOTH, Who Fought in Vietnam?, Social Forces 74 1137-1157 (1996): 1140: "Draftees may not have been preferred for highly skilled support jobs because they were only in the service for 24 months and because they were presumed to be not committed to the military, since they did not volunteer. It was not costeffective to invest heavily in training a draftee who would only use his skills for a short time. In addition, assigning draftees to combat may have aided in recruitment. One recruiting strategy was to offer relatively safe assignments to those who entered voluntarily for an extended period." expensive) to recruit new members of the National Guard. 50 Thus, the old problem of how the state disposes over resources (in this case the good will of a public servant) without having access to these resources in the first place, presents itself with new intensity.
On the other hand, thousands of mercenaries engage in the war in Iraq for the western coalition, employed by profit-oriented private companies. These mercenaries also come from armies such as those built up by Pinochet and the South-African apartheid regime, escalating the problems of outsourcing state responsibilities.
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At present, a fierce debate is raging on rule of law legitimacy and democratic legitimacy.
52
The mounting importance of private security services in public spaces in general and in prison management in particular demonstrates that the scope of the problem is not restricted to (far-away) warfare. 53 However, whether, how and to what degree the rules of public law and constitutional rights apply to those carrying out public services (and whether those services are public after all), is widely disputed.
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In particular, the attempt to liaise between the constitutional rights of various private parties, i.e. third parties to the contract, and the contracting private party, threatens to reach the limits of legally arguable reasonableness. Both forms of cooperation mentioned thus far, the public service in a broad sense on the one hand, and so called 'contracting out' on the other, emanate from fundamentally different constellations and follow different rules today: while the continental forms of public service essentially arose out of the aim of absolutism to create a society guided by comprehensive public welfare, 56 'contracting out' can be traced back mainly to the liberal idea of breaking up the dichotomy of the state and society by introducing so called intermediaries. 57 And while the public service primarily follows the rules of delegation today, 'contracting out' tends to follow the rules of regulation. 58 However, as different as public services and 'contracting out' may be, 59 both cases display the state, understood as uniting society using its monopoly on power, as being incapable of fulfilling the most fundamental responsibilities defined by the social contract using its own resources: the implementation of peace and order. 60 Indeed, the state is essentially dependent on ad-hoc cooperation with society. In the light of what frequently ends as a guarantee reservation only, the concept of privatization is aiming in the wrong direction by insinuating relocation from the area of political responsibility into that of economic responsibility.
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The Irak War is widely defended by arguing that its benefit is internal security for itself and all of its allies.
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The above referenced Swiss federal council report also carefully tends towards this direction: see above, Fn. 53: before pp. 632-633.
B. The Limits of the Welfare State and Overcoming Them
Intervention as a method of the modern welfare state
At the turn of the 20 th century, the administrative responsibilities of the emerging welfare state that aimed to provide social security and social stability on the one hand and politically defined equality on the other hand, multiplied. This is evident for example from the emerging new state responsibilities, especially with regard to infrastructure and the respective discussions by scholars and in politics. 62 The growth of the state administration also meant, although not primarily, an increase of government tasks, but this was expressed more as a tendency of politics to influence and intervene in society directly. 63 From the perspective of administrative contracts, this tendency is of particular interest, as administrative contracts appear in areas in which the administration strives to structure or influence society, even more so where their responsibilities cannot be fulfilled by relying solely on traditional means such as command-like decrees or subsidization. Max Weber had already diagnosed that the boundaries of the Rechtsstaat needed to be redefined in order to rescue the promises made by the welfare state. Max Weber critically: "Securing public bureaucracy by private means to fulfil demands is about to create the future cage of dependence, in which perhaps one day people will be obliged to conform, if a technically sound, i.e rational administration and accommodation run by functionaries is the last and single value that decides on the form of their service." [ The legal debate on nationalization of the railway is particularly concise: see inter alia Seiler, who argues in favour of nationalizing the railway and against contractual solutions, using legal arguments: OSCAR SEILER, Über die rechtliche Natur der Eisenbahn-Konzessionen nach schweizerischem Recht (Zürich, 1888).
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This also applies to private law: see ANDREAS ABEGG, Die zwingenden Inhaltsnormen des Schuldvertragsrechts -ein Beitrag zu Geschichte und Funktion der Vertragsfreiheit (Diss.) (Zürich, 2004 
Two paradigmatic cases of the welfare administration
In the decision of the Zurich administrative court ZR 72 no. 89, dating from 1973, the government of the city of Zurich, upon the request by the commission responsible for the preservation of historic buildings, decreed the protection of two private town houses. As legal basis they quoted the city statute on the protection of historic buildings, which ordered that the effect of objects relevant to heritage conservation "may not be impaired". 65 The owners argued against the conservation decree, arguing that the houses were in such need of renovation that they could no longer be worthy of preservation. 66 The court responded to this objection by admitting the lack of a statutory basis for ordering renovation. Sec. 123 of the cantonal building code only permits intervention in this regard by the police. However, according to the court, without maintenance, especially with regard to buildings in such great need of renovation, the order of protection would be disproportional: the implemented action would not be able to achieve the set objectives intended by heritage conservation. 67 In a spectacular turn, the court nevertheless came to the rescue of heritage conservation:
"Since the administration may not unilaterally order maintenance due to a lack of statutory basis, it has to combine protection with maintenance in an administrative contract. Since the expensive maintenance of historic buildings cannot be justified without giving the building legal protection, these kinds of contracts may be concluded under the condition that a legally binding administrative decree is passed on the protection of the historic building. Alternatively, the administration may combine the protection and maintenance order in a single decree. The formal expropriation procedure has to be instated when negotiations are deemed to have failed." [Translated by AA] 68 This case clearly shows the limits of police law on the one hand and how interventionist law compensates these limits on the other hand: 65 The administrative instruments of police law were unable to combat the passivity of the house owners, who were neglecting the historic buildings; classic protection, with its restraining orders, failed to live up to the administrative aim of preserving the historic buildings.
The court reacted to this drifting apart of administrative means and administrative aims with a combination of police law and contractual instruments, which enabled the administration to directly influence the possible course of action of the private party, without using legal prohibitions and commands. Furthermore, the court avoided the problem of the reservation of statutory powers: The field of a potential contractual agreement was structured by the threat of expropriation. Within this setting the private party was 'free' to enter contractual negotiations and thus strive for a settlement that would only possibly take his needs into consideration. However, at the same time, he would have to contribute to the implementation of those administrative tasks the administration was unable to impose using police law in the first place with this contract. The 'free' will of the private party replaces the legitimacy of Parliament here, i.e. the reservation of statutory powers.
As the Swiss Federal Court Decision 126 I 219 (2000; protection of a historic cinema in Carouge) indicates, the case discussed above of 1973 was neither a oneoff case, nor was it a problem of the past. Brought before the Federal Court were the legal basis and the corresponding statutory preconditions to oblige proprietors to continue economic activity for the purposes of heritage conservation. Notwithstanding the drastic nature of the invasion into the constitutional rights of both the owner and economic beneficiary by denying a change of use, 69 the federal court acknowledged the legitimacy of such measures in view of the function of heritage conservation. 70 However, at the same time the court required close cooperation between the administration and the proprietors, in order to elicit the possibilities of use and modification. Still, the court put into perspective the initial act of protection, which would not change its legal nature to that of a contract, but would remain a non-negotiable act by the sovereign. 71 The phenomena of a welfare administration that resorts to contracts in response to the decline of traditional categories of administrative aims and means on the one hand and of courts recognising contracts as a chance to widen administrative competence beyond the reservation of statutory power on the other hand, is naturally not confined to heritage conservation. Contracts on land development are traditionally used to relieve the administration's resources and to free it from the strict confinement of the statutory basis. The same applies to contracts on taxation, although these infringe the principle of equal administrative treatment and the principle of equal taxation. 74 But at the same time, the taxing authority would not be able to solve the countless cases using the internal resources available on their own without the cooperation of the taxpayer. 75 Although, with few exceptions, 76 the general legitimacy of administrative contracts is no longer disputed, concerns about an administration that is free from the legitimizing bonds of the reservation of statutory power translate into an unstable legal doctrine guiding this sort of cooperation. For German law and as a result of doctrinal transfer Swiss law, unlike French law, have to this day had trouble adequately capturing the interventionist administration, 77 due to their early focus on overcoming the police state and a less advanced judicial review process for administrative actions.
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Expansion of the interventionist state: The activating contract Today, this uncertainty about which legal rules to apply, in view of a limited but expanding administration is radicalized by new types of irritation. Although the following cases seem to reside on a different level, they also involve the role of contracts in a situation in which the administration does not lack the will, but merely the resources to shape society: More recently, a so called 'activating state' 79 increasingly concludes contracts with certain 'clients' such as welfare recipients, unruly adolescents and asylum seekers on aspects of social integration. The early detection of this problem is attributed to Pärli: KURT PÄRLI,
C. New function of contracts between politics and society
The example of state regulation after the state On the basis of another ruling of the Swiss Federal Court, Schweizerischer Treuhänder-Vorband gegen Schweizerische Nationalbank (109 Ib 146; 1983) it may be argued that the first two case groups, the cases on the civil service on the one hand and the cases on welfare administration on the other, constitute parts of a greater context that irritates the law. At the same time, this case may reveal the (future) function of administrative law.
The facts of the case Schweizerischer Treuhänder-Vorband gegen Schweizerische Nationalbank are as follows: During the so called Chiasso-affair (when at the end of the Seventies more than two billion Swiss Francs were brought into Switzerland and Lichtenstein, with the help of a major Swiss bank, allegedly in connection with illicit Italian earnings and tax evasion) the Swiss Federal Council called the Swiss National Bank and the Swiss banks to action. Without any statutory basis, the Swiss National Bank concluded identical, bilateral contracts with the overwhelming majority of the Swiss banks regarding the exercise of due diligence with regard to deposits (CDB).
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As far as the competition amongst other competing trustee organizations was concerned, the new version of the contract in 1982 discriminated against the Treuhänder-Verband (Association of Trustees) on the rules of disclosure of the identity of third parties on whose account assets had been invested. The Association of Trustees challenged this discrimination, which had been confirmed in a letter from the Swiss National Bank, as an administrative decision in an administrative-court complaint to the Federal Court. The Federal Court did not take up the complaint, on the grounds that the CDB was a private contract, and, accordingly, the National Bank's note to the Treuhänder-Verband was not an administrative decision that could be challenged. However, in a obiter dictum the Federal Court asserted that the Swiss National Bank "… has to comply with the constitutional basic rights analogously in its private-law activities [sic] ." 100 Thus, the Federal Courts defended the banks' and the Swiss National bank's approach by defining it as private law contracting, thereby dismissing the claim for judicial administrative review. As a result, the Court defended the efforts of the Federal Council, the Swiss National Bank and the majority of Swiss banks to create a new market order for Switzerland. The traditional unilateral course of action by the administration, without inclusion of the bank, lacked time, a legal basis and above all knowledge. However, in less than half a year the collaboration between the National Bank and the Swiss banks lead to a new market order, to which most Swiss banks freely submitted themselves and which adapted more and more to the context-conditions of law, politics and economy in the course of the following year. The alternative to this evolutionary approach set in motion by spontaneous contractual agreement did not appeal to either the banks or to politics: the start of lengthy legislative proceedings -heavily influenced by party politics, less susceptible to the economy and as a result, less predictable for the economy, accompanied by media coverage about banking practices found little appreciationwhich would have allowed for pressure of international politics to build up further.
From the viewpoint of a new and socially adequate description of society, this case exemplifies that a possible new role for politics qua administration would be to mainly confront other areas of society with its demands concerning social integration. The difficulties in forming society according to specific political goals were already evident at the beginning of the 20 th century, and have become more and more apparent today. Thus, the term of regulation (and therefore also the term of the state) increasingly misses the point.
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The form of contract stands out particularly in regard to the question of how these irritations reach other areas of society and consequently trigger mutual adjustment.
